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INTRODUCTION
N no context is the old adage that "knowledge is power" more
accurate than in the conduct of litigation. The counsel who is
forewarned concerning the testimony which will be offered by his
adversary is also forearmed, and thus in some instances he may be
able to destroy the effect of such evidence by skillfully conceived
cross-examination or other means of impeachment. In civil cases,
whether in federal or state courts, there has been increasing ex-
pansion of the tools and techniques of discovery-such as the more
extensive and liberalized use of depositions, interrogatories, requests
for admissions, and, in personal injury cases, physical examinations
of plaintiffs. In criminal cases, however, the expansion of discovery
devices has generally proceeded much more slowly.’
For the most part, the nonavailability of comprehensive instru-
mentalities of discovery in criminal proceedings seems to be far less
of a handicap to the prosecutor than to the defense counsel, whether
he be privately retained, assigned by the court, or a public defender.
The former may have available extensive investigative reports and
statements from witnesses to aid him; the latter may have nothing
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I In some instances discovery may be available in criminal cases under circumstances
where it would not be available in civil litigation. For example, the opportunities for
the prosecution to obtain discovery through the arrest of the accused and his interroga-
tion by police officers or through the proceedings of a grand jury, where a prospective
defendant’s counsel is not available and the minutes are generally unavailable to
defendant for inspection, have no parallel in civil actions. In some jurisdictions a
defendant who relies upon an insanity defense may be hospitalized for examination
by impartial experts prior to trial, a procedure for obtaining expert medical evaluation
which is probably not available to the same extent in personal injury litigation. In
some situations the prosecution might be compelled to reveal documents which would
be considered privileged as part of the attorney’s "work product" in a civil case. See
United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir.), remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963). Moreover, the prosecution is regarded
as having responsibilities to a defendant which seem today to go beyond the responsi-
bilities placed upon opposing counsel in the civil courts.
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more at his disposal than the defendant's version of the facts. 2 Of
course, the defense burden is enlarged when the defendant is unable
to post bail and therefore must assist in the preparation of his
defense from a jail cell. Furthermore, while the prosecutor is pre-
cluded by the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination from
submitting formal interrogatories to him, he can make full use of
whatever admissions or confessions the defendant may have made
when he was interrogated by police authorities.3
In opposing any liberalization of a defendant's opportunities
for obtaining information about the prosecution's case, law enforce-
ment officials contend that a defendant who is fully apprised of the
evidence to be offered against him may seek to tamper with the
witnesses, to intimidate them into remaining silent, or to suborn
perjury.4 Witnesses, it has been suggested, would be much less
willing to come to the police with information if they were aware
that the defendant would learn before trial of their identity and
probable testimony and so might try to suppress their evidence by
one means or another. Furthermore, it is argued that since the
opportunities for the prosecution to obtain discovery from the
defendant are limited at the threshold by the privilege against self-
SIf the effective assistance of defense counsel is to be truly meaningful in the
representation of indigents, provision should be made for qualified investigators to aid
the defense attorney, whether he be assigned counsel or a public defender. Insofar
as indigent defendants are concerned, it is encouraging to note the efforts which are
being made to increase the likelihood that an indigent defendant will be released
prior to trial, rather than kept in jail because he cannot make bail. The availability
of the defendant to assist in investigating the facts before trial is often much more
important than the availability of discovery devices. Sometimes a defendant is pro-
vided with formidable investigative assistance by his liability insurance carrier if the
criminal charges pertain to an accident which may also involve extensive civil liability.
3 Of course, admissibility is subject to the requirement of voluntariness and, in the
federal courts, to the additional requirement that upon arrest a defendant be taken
"without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner" for a prelim-
inary examination. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
&Sometimes a witness can be induced to claim his own privilege against self-
incrimination and thereby thwart interrogation. A federal court has recently ruled
that bribery, coercion, threat, or corruptly motivated advice to induce a prospective
grand jury witness to exercise his fifth amendment privilege constitutes obstructing the
due administration of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958). Cole v. United
States, 329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1964). How far can this view be taken? If a defendant's
attorney points out to prospective Government witnesses that their testimony may
prove self-incriminating and that, absent some binding assurance of immunity, it may
lead to their own prosecution, has he obstructed justice? And what is the criminal
liability, if any, of a prosecutor, a defense attorney, or counsel in civil litigation who
emphasizes to his witnesses that they are under no obligation to talk to anyone,
especially to the opposing counsel, about the pending case?
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incrimination5 and since the defendant is shielded during the trial by
many procedural safeguards, such as the presumption of innocence,
to add an extensive right of discovery to his arsenal might completely
unbalance the odds against the state.6
Defense attorneys reply that unless they have access before trial
to certain types of information in the hands of the prosecution, the
defendant cannot really be assured of receiving a fair trial.7 Among
the items of information for which they insist discovery is needed
are copies of a defendant's own statements to the police-which may
be relevant in determining what plea to offer and whether to move
for suppression or exclusion of certain evidence, either before or at
the trial-and copies of statements made to the police by any co-
defendants-which may not only be useful at the trial but also in
connection with any pretrial motion for severance. Similarly,
defense counsel would wish to see any statements of a probable
Government witness, both as a basis for deciding what plea to enter8
and for possible impeachment of the witness by prior inconsistent
statements if his testimony at the trial varies materially from the
pretrial statements. Even the statements of persons whom the Gov-
ernment does not plan to call as witnesses may be valuable to the
This privilege, however, has generally not been considered as a bar to statutes
requiring that a defendant give notice of an alibi defense or of an intention to plead
insanity. See Nedrud, The Role of the Prosecutor in Criminal Procedure, 32 U. Mo.
AT KAN. CiTy L. Rv. 142, 159 (1964). For a case in which the California Supreme
Court sanctioned the prosecution's right to obtain discovery of the names and addresses
of witnesses that the defendant intended to call and of certain medical evidence which
he intended to introduce in support of his defense that he was sexually impotent to
commit the alleged rape, see Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962).
o For a frequently cited opinion by Chief Justice Vanderbilt in which the arguments
are cogently presented against discovery in criminal cases, see State v. Tune, 13 N.J.
203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). See also Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v.
Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), and Flannery's statement of the prosecutor's
position in Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 74-81
(1963).
7See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or
Apparent?, 49 CALw. L. Rav. 56 (1961); Pye, Symposium, supra note 6, at 82-94.
8 Sometimes a view of the statements of Government witnesses will lead a defense
counsel to suggest to his client that he plead guilty, either to the offense charged or
to some lesser included offense. With this in mind, prosecutors are probably quite
willing to show the defense counsel a substantial portion of their file when they
consider that they have an airtight case. Of course, if the prosecutor, while showing
defense counsel only a portion of his file, fails to disclose documents which contain
evidence favorable to the accused and does not make it clear to defense counsel that
he may not be seeing all the available documents, a plea of guilt subsequently entered
on the advice of defense counsel might be attacked on due process grounds. Compare
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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defense in suggesting the availability of evidence which might aid
its theory of the case.
To supplement the discovery of testimony expected from a
Government witness, a defense counsel would also wish to receive
information pertinent to his credibility, especially information con-
cerning any criminal record the witness might have. While a
prosecutor, either in a federal or state court, generally is able to
ascertain the criminal record of the defendant or of any witness
by requesting this information from the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, a request by a defense attorney for similar information will
almost always prove unavailing.9 Although the attorney is free at the
trial to cross-examine any witness concerning his prior convictions
in order to impeach his credibility, this method of impeachment is
subject to several legal and practical limitations.' 0
To the extent that a defendant lacks funds for performing
relevant scientific tests, the results of any such tests performed by
Government experts will be especially valuable." Moreover, even
a wealthy defendant may find, when he begins preparing his defense,
that it is too late to perform some of the scientific tests which might
be important in establishing his innocence and that, therefore, un-
less he can obtain results of the Government-performed tests, there
is no way for him to procure the necessary information. Moreover,
in some instances, the physical objects upon which the defendant
desires to have tests performed may be in the hands of the prosecution
for use as evidence at the trial, so that, without either the cooperation
of the prosecution or the intervention of the court, it will be im-
possible to have the tests made.
The problem of discovery also arises in connection with sen-
tencing, when the trial judge may rely on a presentencing report
prepared by a probation officer or other official. While in a few
states the defendant and his counsel have access to this report and
therefore have an opportunity to rebut or to supplement the in-
9 Dean Pye discusses and illustrates this problem in Symposium, supra note 6, at
87-88. He also describes the results of a mixup which for a short period of time made
this information available to attorneys for indigent defendants in the District of
Columbia.
10 See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (1954 ed.); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 980, 981,
1003, 1005 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
21 For some comments on legal problems connected with the use of new scientific
techniques in criminal investigation, see Everett, New Procedures of Scientific Investiga-
tion and the Protection of the Accused's Rights, 1959 DUKE L.J. 32.
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formation it contains, in the federal courts and in most state courts
no requirement exists that the defense be made aware of the contents
of the report prior to sentencing,12 although, of course, the judge
may choose to reveal the contents. Many defense attorneys argue
that even if the confidentiality of the presentencing report makes
it easier for the court to obtain pertinent information, this advantage
is offset by the hardship to a defendant which may result when the
report contains erroneous derogatory information which the accused
never has an opportunity to rebut.
I
CURRENT FEDERAL DIScoVERY PRACTICE
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure make some provision
for discovery by a defendant in criminal cases. Rule 5 (c) provides
for a preliminary examination before a United States commissioner
following an arrest, at which time the defendant has an opportunity
to hear the evidence against him, to cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence in his own behalf. This preliminary examina-
tion provides far less than complete discovery. The Government
need produce only enough evidence to show probable cause, and it
is not precluded in any way from calling witnesses to testify at the
trial who were not present at the preliminary examination. The
defendant may be appearing at the preliminary examination without
counsel to assist him in evaluating the evidence or in cross-examining
the Government witnesses.13 Moreover, there is no requirement of
a preliminary examination if a grand jury has already returned an
indictment.14 Thus, the United States attorney may eliminate any
opportunity for a preliminary examination by submitting a case in
the first instance to a grand jury for an indictment; and even if a
defendant is arrested before an indictment is returned, the prosecu-
tor may be able to obtain a postponement of preliminary examina-
22 See Symposium, supra note 6, at 123-28.
13 At what time must counsel be provided for an indigent defendant? This ques-
tion has become more significant since the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that state courts must provide counsel for indigent
defendants even in noncapital cases.
14 Roddy v. United States, 296 F.2d 9 (10th Cir. 1961); Nelson v. Sacks, 290 F.2d 604
(6th Cir. 1961); Boone v. United States, 280 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960); Barrett v. United
States, 270 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1959); United States v. Universita, 192 F. Supp. 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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tion and during the period of postponement obviate the need there-
for by obtaining a grand jury indictment.1 5
Rule 7 (f) authorizes a bill of particulars. While a defendant
may be able to obtain some desired information by a motion for a
bill of particulars, he generally cannot use it as a means to learn
of the Government's witnesses or the documents and testimony
which it plans to offer.16
* Rule 16, entitled "Discovery and Inspection," provides that upon
motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment
or information, the court may order that he be permitted "to inspect
and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or
tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or
obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that
the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense
and that the request is reasonable." Several severe restrictions are
implicit in the wording of this rule. For example, statements made
to Government investigators by witnesses, or even by codefendants,
presumably would not have been obtained "by seizure or by process"
and so would not be subject under rule 16 to discovery or in-
spection. Similarly the results of forensic tests performed by Govern-
ment experts-or, for that matter, by private experts-would not
constitute items obtained "by seizure or by process." A major ques-
tion exists as to whether even a written statement made by the
defendant himself to law enforcement officials would constitute a
"'paper," "document," or "tangible object" "obtained from or be-
longing to" him.17 A tape recording of an interview with the de-
fendant by investigators would seem even less subject than a written
confession to discovery and inspection under rule 16. S
Rule 17, entitled "Subpoena," provides in subsection (c) that
15 United States v. Universita, supra note 14.
10 See materials prepared by E. Barrett Prettyman Fellows, LAw AND TArICS IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 128-41 (mimeographed copy 1963).
27 See United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828
(1962); Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955); Shores v. United States,
174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v. Fancher, 195 F. Supp. 448 (D. Conn.
1961); United States v. Berman, 24 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. Zimmer-
man, 20 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
18 Compare the holding of a Maryland lower court that the plaintiff in a civil case
was not entitled to discovery of a tape-recorded interview with the defendant's
claims investigator, although she would have been entitled to a copy of any signed
statement which she had made. Foreman v. American Stores Co., 32 U.S.L. WEEK
2149 (Baltimore Super. Ct., Sept. 4, 1963).
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A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to
produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated there-
in. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court
may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the
subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or
prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon
their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or
portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
The wording of this rule does not contain the express limitations
upon the source of the documents and papers or the manner in which
they were obtained that exist under rule 16. As the Supreme Court
made clear in Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States,19 "any document
or other materials, admissible as evidence, obtained by the Govern-
ment by solicitation or voluntarily from third persons is subject to
subpoena," At the same time, however, the Court indicated that
rule 17 was not intended to give a right of discovery in the broadest
terms or to authorize a "fishing expedition." While rule 17 (c)
seeks to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before
trial for the inspection of the subpoenaed materials, it can only be
used in "a good-faith effort ... to obtain evidence."20
If a defense counsel does not already know the documents which
are in the Government's files, he will find it difficult to describe with
sufficient detail the papers which he wishes produced for inspection
prior to trial under rule 17 (c), and he will accordingly run the
risk of a motion by the Government to quash his subpoena on the
ground either that compliance would be "unreasonable or oppres-
sive" or that the defendant is simply engaged in a "fishing expedi-
tion" like that condemned in the Bowman Dairy case. In seeking to
subpoena his own pretrial statements and those of prospective Gov-
ernment witnesses for inspection prior to trial, the defendant may
also encounter objections from the United States attorney either that
he is attempting to circumvent the limitations of rule 16, which
deals specifically with discovery, by resort to rule 17 (c) or that pre-
trial statements, regardless of by whom they were made, are not the
"evidence" which the Supreme Court had in mind when it inter-
preted rule 17 in the Bowman Dairy case. Of course, pretrial
statements by a Government witness would only become admissible
20 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951).201d. at 220.
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after that witness had taken the stand, and then only for such pur-
poses as impeachment or corroboration.2 1 Pretrial statements by a
defendant could be offered against him by the prosecution as ad-
missions or confessions, but they could only be offered by the
defendant under certain circumstances as prior consistent statements
to corroborate his own testimony after he had taken the stand in his
own behalf at the trial.22
The limited opportunity for the defendant to use as evidence at
the trial any pretrial written statement made either by him or by
others would suggest strongly that the draftsmen of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure did not intend for a defendant to be
able to secure inspection of such documents in the hands of the
Government under rule 17 (c) if such an inspection was unavailable
under rule 16, which purports to deal specifically with discovery
and inspection. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has noted in
another connection, the plain words of rule 17 (c) "are not to be
ignored." 23  Rule 17 (c) purports to deal with documentary evidence,
and pretval statements by any witness, including a defendant, often
do become admissible at a trial for impeachment or corroboration
purposes. Therefore, it is difficult to controvert a defendant's
assertion that he is seeking inspection of pretrial statements in "a
good-faith effort . . . to obtain evidence. ' 24  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has stated that there "was no intention to exclude
from the reach of process of the defendant any material that had
2 Impeachment by prior inconsistent statements is discussed in 3 WloamOan §§ 1017-
46, and rehabilitation of a witness by a showing of prior consistent statements is treated
in 4 id. §§ 1122-33. Under some circumstances, a statement by a witness might also
be admissible as past recollection recorded. 3 id. §§ 734-57. While not admissible as
such, pretrial statements by a witness may also be used to refresh his present recollec-
tion of an event. 3 id. §§ 758-65. In such event, the document used to refresh recol.
lection at the trial must be shown to opposing counsel on demand, and Dean Wigmore
contends that this right of inspection should also apply to a memorandum consulted
for refreshment of memory before trial. 3 id. § 762. The cases concerning the right
of the cross-examiner to inspect notes used by the witness to refresh his recollection
before he came to court to testify are in conflict. Compare People v. Estrada, 54 Cal.
2d 713, 355 P.2d 641 (1960); People v. Silberstein, 159 Cal. App. 2d 848, 323 1'.2d 591
(1958); State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957), with Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942); Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382 (Ist Cir. 1955); Kaufman
v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1947); State v. Strain, 84 Ohio App. 229, 82
N.E.2d 109 (1948); Commonwealth v. Fromal, 32 U.S.L. WaNV 2259 (Pa. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 13, 1963).
22 4 WIoMORE §§ 1122-33.
23 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951).
21 Ibid.
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been used before the grand jury or could be used at the trial."25 It
is almost impossible to say in advance that a pretrial statement could
not be used at a trial, at least for the limited purposes of impeach-
ment, corroboration, or refreshing recollection. Under this reason-
ing-and in the absence of the Jencks Act, which will be discussed
later-a defendant would seem entitled to subpoena for inspection
before trial any pretrial statements made by him, by a Government
witness, or by a codefendant. In favor of this interpretation might
also be the expediting of trials which would result from eliminating
the necessity for a defense counsel to request a delay during the trial
to allow him to inspect any pretrial statement or notes being used
by a Government witness to refresh his memory.
Even if broadly construed, rule 17 may be of rather limited
utility for an indigent defendant, who must support his motion or
request for a subpoena by an affidavit in which the defendant must
state the name and address of the witness, his expected testimony,
the materiality of the witness' evidence to the defense, that the
defendant cannot safely go to trial without the witness, and that
the defendant is unable to pay the fees of the witness. 26 Certainly
the showing of materiality required under this rule would not foster
"a fishing expedition" by an indigent defendant, and it would seem
almost impossible for him to make such a showing in support of a
motion that federal investigators be subpoenaed to produce for in-
spection under rule 17 (c) any pretrial statements made by the
defendant or by a prospective Government witness. Furthermore,
the indigent defendant's affidavit required under rule 17 actually
provides the Government with discovery concerning the defendant's
theory of the case, and it may contain some damaging admissions
which can be used against him at the trial.
Any discussion of the scope of discovery available under rules 16
and 17 must also reckon with the provisions of both rule 6 (e) and
the Jencks Act.27 Rule 6 (e) prohibits the disclosure, except to
attorneys for the Government, of matters which occurred before
the grand jury and thereby precludes the discovery by the de-
fendant of any testimony given either by himself or by others before
the grand jury, even though this testimony might be of value to the
25 Id. at 221. (Emphasis supplied.)20 FED. R. Ciuif. P. 17 (b).
27 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
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defendant at the trial either to rehabilitate his own testimony by
showing a prior consistent statement or to impeach a Government
witness by showing prior inconsistent statements to the grand jury.
Of course, since the United States attorney has access to the testimony
given before the grand jury, the proceedings there can provide the
Government with a very convenient and rather one-sided form of
discovery, under circumstances where witnesses may, in the absence
of counsel, inadvertently waive privileges available to them. Even
though it was enacted subsequent to rule 6, the Jencks Act was
considered by the Supreme Court to have no effect upon the secrecy
of grand jury minutes enjoined by that rule.28
The Jencks Act was enacted in September, 1957 as Congress'
response to the Supreme Court decision a few months earlier in
Jencks v. United States,29 and it is codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3500. It
provides.in subsection (a) that
no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was
made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness
(other than the defendant) to an agent of the Government shall be the
subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has
testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
By reason of this statute, the constitutionality of which has thus
far been upheld by the Supreme Court, 0 statements made to Govern-
ment investigators before trial cannot be examined by the defense
attorney until the witness has actually testified on direct examina-
tion; and if the "statement" in question is contained in the minutes
of a grand jury, it will generally not be subject to discovery even
after the witness has testified.31 Since the prohibition applies not
only to Government witnesses but also to prospective Govern-
ment witnesses, it would seem difficult to determine who might
be a "prospective Government witness" for purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 8500 (a) until the prosecution has rested its case, unless prior
thereto the United States attorney had announced that a witness
would not be called32 or unless it appeared at the trial that the
28 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
29 53 U.S. 657 (1957).
30 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S.
343 (1959).
31 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
s2 Perhaps the United States attorney will have made clear in his opening statement
which witnesses he plans to call during the trial.
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Government had not subpoenaed the witness and that he was not
present in court.
While the enactment of the Jencks Act limited the possibilities
for arguing that a defendant is entitled under rule 17 (c) to obtain
a subpoena for the production before trial of statements by pro-
spective Government witnesses, the wording of the act seems, by
negative implication, to authorize some rights of discovery which
might not otherwise exist under rules 16 and 17. For instance,
since 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (a) expressly excludes from its coverage any
"statement or report in the possession of the United States" which
was made by the defendant, it would seem that the statute implicitly
recognizes that a defendant's own statement is subject to discovery
by him. Furthermore, since the statute precludes any pretrial
"subpoena, discovery, or inspection" only with respect to "a Gov-
ernment witness or prospective Government witness," it can be
argued that a statement by one who is not a prospective Govern-
ment witness clearly was recognized by Congress as a proper subject
of subpoena, discovery, or inspection.
Under this view a defense attorney would be free to request
either discovery and inspection under rule 16 or a subpoena for
pretrial production and inspection under rule 17 (c) with respect
to any statements or reports in the possession of the United States
which were made by persons who are not prospective Government
witnesses. However, the defense counsel might still encounter pit-
falls insofar as relief under rule 16 is concerned because of the
restrictive wording of -that rule. Since the defendant would not be
allowed to impeach his own witnesses, he could not claim that he
was seeking to inspect the statements made by persons who were
not prospective Government witnesses with a view toward using
the statements for impeachment purposes. Perhaps defense counsel
could satisfy the requirements of rule 17 (c), as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Bowman Dairy,83 by an argument that the pre-
trial statements might be used in some way by the defendant as
evidence-for example, as prior consistent statements to corroborate
and rehabilitate a witness should he be called by the defense and
"Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951). In that case the
defendant had moved for production of documents and objects obtained by the
Government which were relevant to the allegations or charges.
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impeached by the prosecution, as a basis for refreshing a witness'
recollection, or as prior recollection recorded in a situation where a
witness had forgotten certain events but remembered that his state-
ment constituted an accurate account of those events. As matters
now stand, it is quite unclear to what extent a defendant is entitled
in a federal criminal trial to obtain discovery of pretrial statements
by persons who will probably not be called as Government witnesses,
perhaps because their pretrial statements contain information help-
ful to the defense. However, in light of the present uncertainty, a
defense attorney would seem well-advised to move at an early stage
for an order requiring the Government to inform the defendant of
all prospective Government witnesses on the ground that this is
necessary if the defendant is to be fully cognizant of the limitations
on his discovery rights by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (a). If such a
motion is denied, the defense counsel would probably then wish to
move under both rule 16 and rule 17 for the production of the
statements of all named individuals whom the defense has any reason
to believe might have knowledge pertaining to the case.34 (If the
Government resists production of such statements on the ground
that these persons are prospective Government witnesses within
the meaning of the Jencks Act, subsequent failure by the prosecu-
tion to call such persons as witnesses at the trial may, under some
circumstances, provide a helpful basis for argument by the defense.)
The defense counsel should also seek production by the Government
of statements by any other individuals whose identity is unknown
to the defense, and, in so doing, the defense should advance every
argument or theory available to demonstrate that it is engaged in a
good faith search for evidence rather than in a "fishing expedition."
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the defendant may move under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (b) to
have any statement by the witness produced; in this event the state-
ment is delivered to the trial judge who, after excising those portions
which do not relate to the subject matter of the witness' testimony,
delivers it to the defendant for his use. The defendant may also
1 An indigent defendant might not wish to make such a motion because of the
requirements imposed upon him by the present wording of rule 17 (b). Furthermore,
if the defendant is unsure whether Government investigators have had any contact
with a prospective witness, he may be hesitant to request discovery of any statements
by that person, since the request might alert the prosecution to a possible source of
additional evidence which otherwise might not be known to it.
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seek a reasonable recess to examine the statement, and the likelihood
that a trial will be interrupted by such recesses requested by defense
counsel will undoubtedly prompt the United States attorney, in
some cases, to allow pretrial inspection of witnesses' statements.
Recognizing that investigators take statements in many different
ways, Congress has defined the term "statement" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (e) as
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him; or
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a trans-
scription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an
oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government
and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral
statement.
Cases have already reached the Supreme Court with respect
to the applicability of this definition to particular fact situations.
For example, when has a witness "adopted or approved" a statement
which represents a summary of notes taken by the investigator?35
When is a summary from a stenographic or electrical recording to be
considered a "substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness to an agent of the Government"?3 6 How
rapidly must a transcription be made to be deemed "recorded con-
temporaneously"? 37 Would notes dictated by an FBI agent the
3r See Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963), in which the Court finally
concluded that an interview report prepared by an FBI special agent had been
"adopted" by the witness. Receipts given by witnesses for their expense money were
viewed as "statements" under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (a) in Killian v. United States, 368 U.S.
231, 242 (1961).
30 In Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), the Court held that a 600 word
memorandum summarizing parts of a three and one-half hour interrogation of the
witness by an investigator did not constitute a witness' statement within the meaning
of the Jencks Act. In that same case, the Court also concluded that statements of a
Government witness made to an agent of the Government which do not qualify for
production under the Jencks Act cannot be produced at all and that when it is un-
certain whether production of a particular statement is required by the act, the state-
ment should be submitted to the trial judge for an in camera determination. Accord,
Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367 (1959). Compare Campbell v. United
States, supra note 35.
37 Only "a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement" is required to be
"contemporaneous"; this requirement does not apply to written statements. See Clancy
v. United States, 365 U.S. 312 (1961). In Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487
(1963), the FBI agent had questioned Staula, a witness to the bank robbery involved,
for thirty minutes and had jotted down notes while the witness was answering his
questions. Then the agent, using his notes to refresh his recollection, recited orally
to Staula the substance of the interview, asked him if the recitation was correct, and
received an affirmative answer. Some nine hours later, the agent transcribed the inter-
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day after an interview constitute a "statement" for purposes of the
Jencks Act?38
One other federal statute deserves mention in any discussion
of discovery. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 provides:
A person charged with treason or other capital offense shall at least three
entire days before commencement of trial be furnished with a copy of
the indictment and a list of the veniremen, and of the witnesses to be
produced on the trial for proving the indictment, stating the place of
abode of each venireman and witness.
Since trials for treason and other capital offenses are not common-
place in the federal courts, this statute obviously has limited appli-
cability;39 moreover, the statute would probably not apply to re-
buttal witnesses, 40 so that the prosecution, after establishing a prima
facie case, might hold some of its most damaging witnesses un-
disclosed .and surprise the defendant on rebuttal. Furthermore, for
a defense counsel to have the names of the witnesses that the
Government will call is a far cry from knowing what their testi-
mony will probably be. Although the diligent attorney may seek
to interview the prospective Government witnesses in the hope they
will give him information, any lawyer realizes that prospective
witnesses for the other party, especially if that other party is the
Government, frequently will prove reticent when interviewed before
view report on a dictating machine. After the report had been typed by a secretary from
the transcription, the agent checked its accuracy and then destroyed his notes. Com-
pare Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1962).
38 If an investigator's notes concerning his interview with a witness are destroyed
in good faith and in accord with normal practice, the nonproduction of those notes
upon request by the defense after the conclusion of the direct examination will not
necessarily require the striking of the witness' testimony or the reversal of a conviction
based thereon. See Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961); United States v.
Tomaiolo, 317 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1963). For a case in which there was an allegation
that an investigator had destroyed his notes to avoid their production under the
Jencks Act, see United States v. Aviles, 197 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 315 F.2d
186 (2d Cir.), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Evola v. United States, 375 U.S.
32 (1963).
" The circumstance that a statute has been enacted to require that a list of
prospective Government witnesses be furnished to the defendant in a capital case
would indicate by negative implication that no such requirement exists in noncapital
cases, and the federal courts generally have refused to compel the prosecution to
furnish such a list in noncapital cases. See United States v. Haug, 21 F.R.D. 22 (N.D.
Ohio 1957); United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v.
Brandt, 139 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ohio 1955); United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). Some jurisdictions require that the names of prospective witnesses
be endorsed on the indictment or information. See, e.g., Axsz. R. Cmdr. P. 153.
,0 Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70 (1895); Gordon v. United States, 289 Fed.
552 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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trial. Law enforcement personnel sometimes appear exceedingly
reluctant to converse with a defense attorney, and they may even be
prevented from doing so by the policy or directives of their agency.41
It is not unknown for a prosecuting attorney to suggest to his pro-
spective witnesses that they not talk with anyone about the subject
of their prospective testimony and, whether designedly or otherwise,
this suggestion frequently discourages communication with a de-
fendant's attorney.42 Even an explanation by a prosecutor to wit-
nesses that they are under no obligation to talk with anyone about
the case may be couched in terms which intimate that they would be
well-advised to exercise this option of silence. In light of these cir-
cumstances, the discovery furnished under 18 U.S.C. § 3432 in
capital cases seems almost trivial when compared with the gravity
of the possible punishment for the defendant if convicted.
II
OTHER DIscovERY PRACTICE
The rules governing discovery in criminal cases in state courts
vary markedly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.43 In recent years
some jurisdictions have witnessed a trend towards greater liberaliza-
tion of discovery, both through legislation and judicial decision.
Thus, some states make express provision for discovery of a de-
fendant's pretrial statements to investigators; 44 others allow discovery
"For example, the Air Force's Office of Spedal Investigations apparently has
issued some type of directive under which its agents are severely limited in their
freedom to discuss a case with defense counsel. A question might be raised as to
whether such a directive impairs the accused's right to counsel and to due process
by making it more difficult for the defense counsel to obtain information.
2A survey of discovery practice in the District of Columbia reveals that some
prosecutors there either discourage witnesses from talking with defense representatives
or suggest that any interviews be held in the presence of the United States attorney.
One assistant United States attorney apparently tells witnesses not to talk to defense
representatives at all. See Symposium, supra note 6, at 117. Some question might be
raised about the consistency of such practices with the constitutional guarantees of the
right to counsel and due process. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4For some of the recent articles on this subject, see Bradshaw, Discovery in
Criminal Cases: The Problem in Texas, 1 HoUSTON L. REv. 158 (1963); Datz, Discovery
in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 163 (1963); Garber, The Growth of Crim-
inal Discovery, 1 CRIM. L.Q. 3 (1962); Louisell, supra note 7; Nedrud, supra note 5.
"I DEL. SUPER. CT. (CRIA.) R. 16; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 729 (1934); MD. R. CRIM.
P. 728. For decisions allowing discovery of a defendant's statements, see Powell v.
Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22
So. 2d 273 (1945); People v. Johnson, 856 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959); State v.
Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958) (although denying inspection of statements
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of witnesses' statements in the hands of the prosecution; 45 and in
some instances a defendant has succeeded in obtaining access before
trial to reports concerning the results of scientific investigations
made by experts.46
In some states new tools for discovery have been placed in the
hands of the prosecution by virtue of statutory requirements that
a defendant give notice of his intention to prove alibi47 or to rely
on an insanity defense.48 Recently the Supreme Court of California,
reasoning that pretrial discovery should not be a one-way street,
upheld that portion of a trial court's order which required the
defendant in a rape case to reveal the names and addresses of wit-
nesses he intended to call and to produce before trial reports and
X-rays he intended to introduce in evidence to support his defense of
impotence.49 In support of the result, which was reached without
by prospective prosecution witnesses); State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d
319 (1959).
In United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1963), a
federal court of appeals concluded that the refusal of the prosecutor in a state court
trial to let the defendant see his own pretrial statement deprived him of due process
under the concepts expressed by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
1r People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 367 P.2d 680 (1962) (defendant allowed dis-
covery of codefendant's statements); People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 338 P.2d 428
(1959); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
See also State v. Pacheco, 38 N.J. 120, 183 A.2d 54 (1962), and Commonwealth v.
Smith, 412 Pa. 1, 192 A.2d 671 (1963), which approve the principle established in the
Jencks case that a defendant should have access for impeachment purposes to prior
statements by prosecution witnesses. In Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.
1961), the refusal of the prosecution to allow inspection by the defense of a pretrial
statement made by a key prosecution witness was one circumstance which led to the
holding that a robbery conviction in a state court was lacking in due process.
46 Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133, 343 P.2d 139 (1959) (photographs
used in identifying the accused); Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 513,
328 P.2d 68 (1958) (coroner's and pathologist's reports and other scientific reports);
Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (1957) (autopsy report
and report from Criminal Bureau of Identification); State ex rel. Sadler v. Lackey,
319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) (FBI report concerning certain specimens
scraped from defendant's car); Dijoseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958);
State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959) (autopsy report and FBI
reports on an examination of clothing, personal effects, and blood samples of defendant
and of victim).
47 Notice of alibi is apparently required in Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Nedrud, supra note 5, at 159.
48 Notice of an insanity defense is provided for in Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Vermont. See Nedrud, supra note 5, at 159.
40 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962). This case is dis-
cussed extensively in a Note in 76 HARV. L. REV. 838 (1963), which also describes
the various state statutes dealing with alibi and insanity defenses and the policies
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the aid of enabling legislation, Justice Traynor, writing for the
majority, relied in part on the decisions in other jurisdictions which
had upheld the constitutionality of statutes requiring a defendant
to give notice of an alibi defense. With respect to the present
California situation, several other observations seem relevant: (1)
that state, by judicial decision, has probably gone further than any
other in providing pretrial discovery for defendants in criminal
cases; 50 (2) the development of a strong public defender system there
has helped assure that tools of discovery will be used as they become
available; 51 (3) as if to offset the procedural advantages available
to the defendant, comment may be made on his failure to take the
stand,5 2 so that there is considerable pressure for him to testify at
his trial rather than to remain silent and rely primarily upon the
presumption of innocence.
The English courts impose requirements of discovery which are
quite beneficial to defendants. 53 At a preliminary hearing, dep-
ositions are taken of the various witnesses and reduced to writing.
Under most circumstances, a witness cannot be called by the prosecu-
tion to testify unless he has given a written deposition prior to trial;
therefore, the defendant knows the substance of all the prosecution's
expected testimony and can prepare his defense accordingly. The
Scottish courts, which draw on a legal tradition somewhat different
from that of England, also require that the depositions of pro-
spective prosecution witnesses be reduced to writing and copies
thereof furnished to the defense prior to trial in order for them to
testify.54 Neither in Scotland nor England does there appear to be
any requirement that the defense be furnished with statements taken
applicable in this field. Apparently the Note writer considers that the discovery order
in Jones did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional safeguards against self-
incrimination, unreasonable search and seizure, and denial of due process. See also
People v. Lopez, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963), for a more recent treatment of
discovery problems by the California Supreme Court.
50 See the discussion of the California cases in Garber, supra note 43, at 18-22;
Louisell, supra note 7, at 74-86.
'1 The existence in the District of Columbia of the Legal Aid Agency and of the
Georgetown Legal Internship Program has probably helped produce a trend in that
jurisdiction towards greater liberalization of discovery in behalf of defendants.
"Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
"With respect to the English practice, see DEVLIN, THm CRIMINAL PROSECunON IN
ENrLAND (1958); Louisell, supra note 7, at 64-67.
" The writer's information concerning criminal procedure in Scotland is based
on conversations with Professor Paul Hardin of the Duke Law School faculty, who is
currently preparing a paper for publication on that subject.
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by the police from persons whom the prosecution does not intend
to call to testify.
In American courts-martial, under the requirements of the
Manual for Courts-Martial,55 the statements of all witnesses are
furnished to the accused and his counsel as a matter of course.
Generally copies of all statements are made available, without regard
to whether a person whose statement is furnished to defense counsel
will probably be called as a prosecution witness. Frequently, there-
fore, a defense counsel will be provided by the prosecution with
summaries of testimony to be expected from persons who ultimately
will probably testify for the defense rather than for the prosecu-
tion.56
Although a rather broad discovery procedure exists in other legal
systems and appears to operate smoothly there, it should be em-
phasized that this circumstance does not constitute absolute proof
that equally broad discovery should be provided in American state
and federal courts. Perhaps in the other legal system, there exist
other rules which avoid undue weighting of the scales in favor of the
defense. Perhaps also the type of crime which constitutes the largest
part of the workload in the other legal system renders it more feasible
there to grant an accused a broad right of discovery. For example,
the English courts allow extensive comment upon the evidence by
the trial judge, including comment upon a defendant's failure to
take the stand; 57 and this advantage for the prosecution may help
"The MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, provides that "counsel may
properly interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing side in any
case without the consent of opposing counsel or the accused." 42c. Prior to trial
the prosecutor, termed in the MANUAL the trial counsel, "should advise the defense
of the probable witnesses to be called by the prosecution, and the fact that the defense
has not been so advised with respect to a witness who appears at the trial may be a
ground for a continuance." Id. 44h. Moreover, the trial counsel will "permit the
defense to examine from time to time any paper accompanying the charges, including
the report of investigation and papers sent with the charges on a rehearing." Ibid.
The accompanying papers would normally include a signed summary of the testimony
expected from each witness or other source. Id. 31b, 32f (4) (a). Frequently a
copy of the statements of witnesses will be furnished to the accused and his counsel
when the charges are served upon him by the trial counsel.
56 Occasionally problems will arise concerning information contained in certain
investigation reports or concerning evidence of a confidential or secret nature.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S., 1951, 151b (3). In such a case, special applica-
tion must be made by defense counsel for access to the classified information. Ibid.
Military law also recognizes the informer's privilege. Id. 151b (1).
51 As noted earlier, California, the state which probably has been the most liberal
in granting discovery to defendants, also permits comment on a defendant's failure to
take the stand. However, California also allows the defendant's credibility to be im-
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offset the discovery provided the defense. Neither English courts
nor American courts-martial have heretofore generally been con-
fronted with trials involving organized crime; hence the danger that
a defendant who has discovered the names and expected testimony of
prosecution witnesses may seek to intimidate them may be con-
siderably less than in many of the cases brought to trial in some
state and federal courts. Moreover, in courts-martial a high per-
centage of cases is tried on the basis of confessions by the accused,
and in such instances the availability of discovery for the accused is
generally not too great a disadvantage for the prosecution. Also,
military authorities are frequently in position to hold witnesses in
line for the prosecution against any pressures by the defense to
persuade them to change their testimony.58 In short, any argument
for discovery based on its success in other systems should not be
accepted uncritically.
III
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In December, 1962, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
to the Judicial Conference of the United States distributed for com-
ment by the bench and bar a number of proposed amendments to
those rules, some of which dealt with discovery. The proposed
amendments envisaged a bilateral expansion of discovery, since
proposed rule 12A provided that upon proper demand by the Gov-
ernment, a defendant must give notice of alibi, with the sanction
that, absent such notice, he would not be permitted to introduce
evidence of alibi at the trial other than his own testimony, unless
the court for cause ordered otherwise. Moreover, the pretrial con-
ference authorized under proposed rule 17A upon motion of either
party or by the court's own motion would in many instances tend in
practice to provide discovery for both the prosecution and the
defense.
peached by cross-examination concerning his prior convictions, while such impeach-
ment of a defendant is generally prohibited or very narrowly circumscribed in the
English courts.
"
8In fact, military justice is sometimes criticized on the ground that witnesses are
subject to some type of inherent coercion, including a coercion not to alter their
testimony or to give testimony favorable to the accused.
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A proposed revision of rule 16 would permit a defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents
or tangible objects "which are within the possession, custody, or
control of the Government, including written or recorded state-
ments or confessions made by the defendant, and the results or
reports of physical examinations and scientific tests, experiments
and comparisons." Thus, the currently existing restriction under
rule 16 that the books, papers, documents or objects must have
been "obtained from or belonging to the defendant, or obtained
from others by seizure or by process" would be eliminated. More-
over, for the first time there would be clear authority for a de-
fendant to obtain inspection of his own pretrial statements or
confessions, regardless of their form;"" and also for the first time,
the results of scientific tests would be clearly subject to discovery
and inspection under rule 16. However, the restrictions imposed
upon pretrial discovery and inspection by the Jencks Act would be
left unimpaired.
Under the amendments proposed in December, 1962, neither
rule 6 (e), dealing with the secrecy of grand jury minutes, nor rule
17, concerning subpoenas, would be altered. However, the need
to stretch rule 17 (c) by judicial interpretation to authorize discovery
through the issuance of subpoenas for documentary evidence to be
produced for inspection before trial would be minimized by the
expansion of rule 16.60
Broadening of discovery was also suggested with respect to the
report of presentence investigation which is provided for under
rule 32 (c). Currently this rule makes no express provision for
discovery by the defendant of the contents of this report before
imposition of the sentence, and the federal courts have generally
not viewed the report as being subject to discovery,61 apparently on
the premise that the report, in order to be helpful to the sentencing
' Some authority for this position might arguably be inferred on the basis of a
negative implication in the wording of the Jencks Act, 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (a) (1958).
60For an example of such stretching, see Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885 (1953), holding that it was error to deny pre-
trial inspection under rule 17 (c) with respect to defendant's pretrial statement.
61 See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 854 (1960). But cf. Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955).
There is no constitutional right to disclosure. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949).
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judge, must contain a substantial amount of information obtainable
only in the expectation that it will be kept in confidence. The
amendment proposed in December, 1962, would provide:
Upon request of the defendant the court before imposing sentence shall
disclose to the defendant or his counsel a summary of the material
contained in the report of the presentence investigation and afford an
opportunity to the defendant or his counsel to comment thereon. The
sources of confidential information need not, however, be disclosed.
Under this proposal the defendant would receive a more meaningful
opportunity to rebut derogatory information pertinent to sentencing,
an opportunity which, incidentally, has been zealously assured for
the accused in American military justice. 2
Various criticisms were offered with respect to the proposed
amendments. It was contended that the proposed revisions still left
the defendant's right of discovery too unclear or too restricted. For
example, under the amendments proposed in December, 1962, would
a defendant be entitled to inspect the statements of a codefendant?
Or to examine a copy of any testimony which he had himself given
before a grand jury? Or the criminal record of a prospective Gov-
ernment witness? Other critics of these proposals questioned the
desirability of requiring a notice of alibi and contended that regard-
less of state court decisions upholding statutes which require it, such
a notice invaded the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination and was fundamentally unfair to defendants. At the same
time they contended that the existing discovery in favor of the
prosecution which results from the showing required of an indigent
defendant under rule 17 (b) as a prerequisite to his obtaining a
subpoena for the presence of a desired witness produces an un-
warranted-and perhaps unconstitutional-discrimination against the
poor.
In March, 1964, a second preliminary draft of proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was released for
comment and suggestions. Once again many of the proposals have
relevance to discovery, although in some instances this relevance
may not be immediately apparent. For example, proposed amend-
ments to rules 5 (b) and 44 make it clear that an indigent defendant
is entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every stage
02 See United States v. Lanford, 6 US.C.MA. 371, 20 C.M.R. 87 (1955); EvERTr,
MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 267-68 (1956).
Vol. 1964: 477]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of the proceedings "from his initial appearance before the commis-
sioner or the court"; the availability of counsel to him at the time
of the preliminary examination before the commissoner provided
for under rule 5 (c) will enhance for the indigent defendant the
value of this commissioner's hearing as an instrument of discovery.
Proposed rules 46 and 46.1, which concern release on bail or without
bail, will make it easier for a defendant to be released from pretrial
confinement. The resultant increased likelihood that the defendant
will be available to assist in preparing his defense will reduce the
frequency of the situation where defense counsel are not able to
obtain discovery of the prosecution's case while their clients, by
reason of confinement, are unavailable to aid in preparing the
defense. For this reason, the proposals dealing with release before
trial might be said to lessen somewhat the need for broadened dis-
covery, and, of course, the greater probability that the defendant will
not be in jail before trial may involve a concomitant risk that
he may take advantage of his freedom to intimidate or tamper with
witnesses.
Under the March, 1964, proposals, rule 7, which concerns the
indictment and the information, would be modified to encourage
greater willingness in the federal courts to grant a bill of particulars.
Accordingly, rule 7 (f), authorizing the bill of particulars, might
become a more significant instrument than heretofore for obtaining
discovery. The requirement of a notice of alibi, which was con-
tained in the December, 1962, proposed amendments, is discarded in
favor of a proposed rule 12.1 providing that "if the defendant in-
tends to rely on the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged
crime, he shall, not less than 5 days before the date set for trial,
serve upon the government notice of such intention." As noted
earlier, there is considerable precedent in state statutes for requiring
a defendant to give notice of his intention to rely on an insanity
defense.
. When the proposal was made in December, 1962, that a notice
of alibi be required, some fears were expressed that the intensive
investigation by the Government which would probably follow upon
such a notice might discourage prospective alibi witnesses from testi-
fying or from volunteering information to a defendant or his attorney
in the first instance, and thereby might injure the defendant who
had a legitimate alibi defense. It does not seem likely that any
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similar consequences would follow the notice of insanity required
under rule 12.1; probably any Government investigation which
might follow upon such a notice would have no effect on the avail-
ability to the defendant at trial of the evidence on which he would
rely. The information required from the defendant in a notice of
alibi-namely, the place where he was at the time in question-
seems much more specific in nature than that to be contained in the
general notice provided for under proposed rule 12.1, and the latter
would thus appear to present less of a threat to the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination.
The Advisory Committee's Note to proposed rule 12.1 also
points out that in Lynch v. Overholser,63 the Supreme Court ruled
that a defendant had a right to determine whether to raise the issue
of insanity and that the required notice of insanity would preclude
any problem of deciding whether the defendant relied on insanity.
While this is true, the same problem would be as easily eliminated
by a procedure for the defendant to plead insanity at the trial or
to make some statement then that he intended to rely on an insanity
defense, rather than by requiring notice of an insanity defense at
least five days before trial. The real justification for such notice does
not lie in dispelling uncertainty as to whether the defendant relies on
insanity but in providing the Government with suitable opportunity
to prepare to meet the issue.
Under the amendments proposed in March, 1964, the following
sentence would be added to rule 14, which concerns relief from
prejudicial joinder:
In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order
the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection
in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which
the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
Under this proposal, the in camera inspection now utilized in deter-
mining iyhether a statement is subject to inspection under the
Jencks Act would be used by the district judge in deciding whether
to grant a motion for severance. 64
A confession offered in evidence against one defendant cannot
be considered against his codefendant, and limiting instructions are
-- 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
0, See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354 (1959) (procedure for in camera
inspection).
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normally given to this effect. However, such instructions seldom
erase the effect of the codefendant's confession; 65 and where a de-
fendant anticipates that the confession of a codefendant may be
offered, he will probably consider favorably a motion for severance
to avoid this possible source of prejudice. Heretofore the unavail.
ability of any clear right to discovery of the codefendant's statement
sometimes has made it difficult to substantiate the basis for the
motion; and if the issue was raised again at the trial, as by a motion
for a mistrial after the codefendant's confession had been received
in evidence, the defendant then was confronted with the reluctance
of a trial judge to grant such relief at that stage in the proceedings.
The proposed addition to rule 14 provides significant assistance
to the defendant in coping with this problem, since the judge ruling
on the motion for severance is more clearly apprised at that time of
the possibility of prejudice at the trial through the admission in
evidence of the codefendant's confession. However, it is important
to remember that under this proposal by the Advisory Committee,
the defendant still does not receive inspection of the codefendant's
statement. Indeed, the fact that rule 14 would now deal specifically
with the statement of a codefendant might make it more difficult to
argue that such a statement would be subject to discovery and in-
spection under rule 16, even in the form that rule would take under
the proposed amendments.
Moreover, insofar as rule 14 is concerned, the defendant will
have to make his motion for severance before knowing what is in
his codefendant's statements to investigators or, in some instances,
whether any statements at all were made by the codefendant. Under
these circumstances, it may be difficult for a defendant to argue that
he is prejudiced by the contents of a codefendant's statements, since
he does not know the contents of the statements; and in this regard,
he must rely considerably on the fairness and perspicacity of the
judge hearing the motion for severance.
The defendant does not receive a copy of the codefendant's state-
ments to use for impeachment purposes if that codefendant enters
a plea and testifies for the Government; however, under the Jencks
Act he could insist upon receiving a copy of the statements at the
61 Prosecutors are sometimes accused of favoring joint trials where there is a con-
fession by only one defendant in the hope that this confession will be given weight
by the jury against the other defendants.
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conclusion of the direct examination of the codefendant. If, how-
ever, that codefendant takes the stand in his own defense and gives
damaging testimony, the defendant would not qualify for relief
under the Jencks Act and yet might still not be clearly entitled to
discovery of the codefendant's pretrial statements. Of course, if
there is no inconsistency between positions to be taken by several
defendants and their respective counsel are cooperating in preparing
the defense, then each defendant can obtain a copy of his own state-
ments-this would be clearly authorized under proposed changes in
rule 16 and may already be implied in the wording of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (a)-and he can then exchange copies with his codefendants.
Currently rule 15, which deals with depositions, only authorizes
the taking of depositions upon motion of a defendant; however, the
taking of such depositions is not allowed solely for discovery pur-
poses. Instead it is dependent upon the materiality of the witness'
testimony, his probable inability to attend the trial, and the necessity
to take the deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice. Under
the March, 1964, proposals, rule 15 would be amended to allow the
taking of a deposition at the instance not only of the defendant but
also of the Government or the witness. However, the limitations
upon the taking of depositions remain such that depositions could
not become instruments of discovery by the prosecution. Proposed
rule 15 (g) would make it clear that if the witness' deposition is
taken at the instance of the Government or the witness, the same
obligation will exist to furnish the defendant with copies of the
witness' pretrial statements that would exist under the Jencks Act if
the witness were testifying at the trial.66
The March, 1964, proposals envisage a far more sweeping re-
vision of rule 16, which governs discovery and inspection, than was
proposed in the December, 1962, amendments. As was the case in
the earlier proposed amendment, the requirement that the defendant
can discover only items "obtained from or belonging to the de-
fendant or obtained from others by seizure or process" would be
deleted; the source of the documents to be discovered would become
unimportant. Furthermore, the defendant would be specifically
authorized to inspect any written or recorded statements or con-
Ga If the Government fears that some effort will be made to eliminate a witness
whose identity and expected testimony it has been compelled to disclose, then it
might wish to take his deposition pursuant to rule 15 as amended.
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fessions which he himself had made, as well as any recorded testi-
mony he had given before a grand jury. Results of physical and
mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments0 7 made in
connection with the particular case "which are known by the attorney
for the government to be within the possession, custody or control
of the government" would also be subject to discovery.
Under the proposal of December, 1962, the discovery of the
defendant's pretrial statements and the results of physical examina-
tions and scientific tests, experiments, and comparisons would re-
quire "a showing that the items sought may be material to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable." How-
ever, under the March, 1964, proposal, the defendant would ap-
parently be entitled automatically to inspect and copy his own
pretrial statements in whatever form, any recorded testimony he had
given before a grand jury, and the results of any physical or mental
examinations and any scientific tests or experiments made in con-
nection with the particular case; reasonableness and materiality of
the request would be conclusively presumed.
The defendant would also have a right to inspect and copy or
photograph other "books, papers, documents or tangible objects ...
within the possession, custody or control of the government"; but as
to these items, he would be required to show materiality to the
preparation of his defense and the reasonableness of his request.
Furthermore, there would be excepted from discovery any reports,
memoranda, or other internal Government documents made by
Government witnesses covered by the Jencks Act.
Because of the possibility that discovery might be abused-for
instance, by an attempt to tamper with or eliminate the witness-the
proposed amendment to rule 16 would authorize protective orders
which might deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection. Like-
wise, a procedure is authorized for the Government to make a show-
ing of the necessity for a protective order by means "of a written
statement to be inspected by the court in camera." If relief is
granted to the Government, then the text of the Government's
statement would be sealed and preserved for review by the appellate
court in the event of an appeal.
It was pointed out earlier that the December, 1962, proposed
67According to the Advisory Committee's Note, this right of discovery would
include fingerprint and handwriting comparisons.
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amendments embodied a bilateral expansion of discovery in the form
of the notice of alibi requirement and the pretrial procedure. The
March, 1964, proposal for amendment of rule 16 carries this bi-
lateral expansion much further; proposed rule 16 (c) specifically
authorizes discovery by the Government in these terms:
If the court grants relief sought by the defendant under this rule, it
may condition its order by requiring that the defendant permit the
government to inspect, copy or photograph statements, scientific or
medical reports, books, papers, documents or tangible objects, which the
defendant intends to produce at the trial and which are within his
possession, custody or control.
Interestingly, the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 16 (c) com-
ments:
The question whether this subdivision should go further and permit
limited discovery by the government independently of discovery sought
by the defendant has been considered by the Advisory Committee. A
draft which would accomplish this is presented here as an alternative
to be commented on as an aid to the Committee in future deliberations
on the subject.
Alternative Subd. (c). Discovery by the Government. On motion of
the Government, the court may order the defendant to permit the
Government to inspect, copy or photograph statements, scientific or
medical reports, books, papers, documents or tangible objects, which the
defendant intends to produce at the trial and which are within his posses-
sion, custody or control.
Naturally these proposals raise some questions of constitutional-
ity, especially in terms of the privilege against self-incrimination.
With respect to the proposal which conditions the Government's
right to discovery on the defendant's having sought relief under rule
16, it might be argued that by his own request for discovery, the de-
fendant has waived his right to object on constitutional grounds to
the discovery by the Government of the documents or objects in his
own possession. However, at least one recent Supreme Court case
seems subject to the inference that, on due process grounds, a de-
fendant under some circumstances would have a right to discovery
of evidence in the Government's possession.6 Yet under the word-
ing proposed for rule 16 (c), even the request for the discovery of
information to which the defendant would be entitled on constitu-
tional grounds might be deemed a waiver of his right to resist dis-
08 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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covery by the Government. The manner in which the Government's
right to discovery might become a weapon against the defendant's
own right to discovery makes this proposal by the Advisory Commit-
tee seem objectionable.
Whether the Government's right to discovery is stated in condi-
tional or absolute terms under the proposed revision of rule 16, its
desirability bears close scrutiny. After all, the Government does
obtain considerable discovery of the defendant's case through the
efforts of investigative agencies and the testimony taken by the
giand jury. In addition, the record keeping and reporting require-
ments which have proliferated in American life as a result of govern-
mental regulation are a fertile source of information for use by the
prosecution. Furthermore, the threat of a perjury prosecution is
probably much more of a deterrent to the giving of false testimony
by defense witnesses than by Government witnesses.
Under either alternative proposed by the Advisory Committee,
a defendant would be subject to discovery of items which he "in-
tends to produce at the trial and which are within his possession,
custody or control," apparently on penalty of their inadmissibility at
the trial. When a defendant is called upon to indicate before trial
which items of evidence he will offer at the trial, there would seem
to be serious questions of self-incrimination, unreasonable search
and seizure, and denial of due process, for he is being coerced into
furnishing information which may be used against him. In this con-
nection it should be noted that proposed rule 16 (c) would provide
no assurance to the defendant that, in establishing its own case, the
Government might not use against him the evidence which it had
discovered. His dilemma might be one of determining whether
to run the risk of providing the Government with evidence which
would cure a deficiency in its case or being precluded from pre-
senting this same evidence if it were not presented by the Govern-
ment and became important in connection with his own defense. In
many instances it may be almost impossible before trial to be sure
that some document or object will not be used at the trial, if only
as rebuttal evidence, and undoubtedly questions would arise at
trial as to whether a defendant had previously intended to produce
at the trial some document which he had not furnished to the
Government for inspection. In short, if the discovery by the
Government which would be authorized by proposed rule 16 (c)
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proved constitutional, it might nonetheless prove difficult to ad-
minister.
Proposed rule 16 (g) imposes a continuing duty to disclose. If
a party discovers, after compliance with a discovery order and prior
to or during trial, that it possesses additional material previously
requested which is subject to discovery or inspection under rule 16,
it must notify the other party of the existence of this material; and
the court may grant appropriate relief.69 This continuing duty
would rest upon the defendant as well as the Government, to the
extent that a right of discovery by the Government is authorized.
Since a partial disclosure may sometimes be positively misleading,70
the imposition of this continuing duty seems highly appropriate.
The March, 1964, proposed amendments would relax the require-
ments for issuance of a subpoena at the request of an indigent
defendant (who under the amendment would be termed a defendant
"unable to pay.") No longer would the situation exist in which the
indigent is required to disclose in advance his theory of defense in
order to obtain the issuance of a subpoena at Government expense,
while more wealthy defendants can avoid such disclosure simply
by having the subpoenas issued in blank. Thus one other dis-
advantage attributable to poverty would be mitigated.
Rule 17.1, proposed by the Advisory Committee in March, 1964,
and entitled "Pretrial Procedure," corresponds closely with rule
17A, proposed in December, 1962. However, for reasons not dis-
closed, there is deleted from the later proposal the earlier wording
that "no admission of guilt at the conference shall bind the defendant
or be admissible in evidence."71 In any event, the specific authority
for pretrial conferences, which are now already being used to some
extent even in the absence of a rule,12 should induce informal
0 Since proposed rule 16(g) imposes a continuing duty, the defendant would
presumably be subject to a duty to disclose any change in intention as a result of which
he intended to produce at the trial other documents or objects than those which had
previously been discovered by the Government.
70 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
1 Perhaps it is now intended that certain admissions of guilt will be binding;
perhaps the deletion of this sentence was intended to conform to a change in the
proposed wording under which the "counsel for all parties," rather than the parties
themselves, are ordered to appear for the pretrial conference.
12 See Brewster, Criminal Pre-Trial-Useful Techniques, 29 F.R.D. 442 (1962); Estes,
Pre.Trial Conferences in Criminal Cases, 23 F.R.D. 560 (1959); Kaufman, Pre-Trial in
Criminal Cases, 23 F.R.D. 551 (1959).
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reciprocal discovery. Interestingly, legislation has been proposed to
authorize pretrial conferences in courts-martial.1 3
With respect to presentence investigation reports, the Advisory
Committee proposed in December, 1962, that a defendant or his
counsel should receive "a summary of the material contained in the
report of the presentence investigation." In March, 1964, the pro-
posed right of discovery was broadened by a proposed amendment to
rule 32 (c) to provide that
If the defendant is represented by counsel and so requests, the court
before imposing sentence shall permit counsel for the defendant to read
the report of the presentence investigation (from which the sources of
confidential information may be excluded) and shall afford such counsel
an opportunity to comment thereon. If the defendant is not represented
by counsel and so requests, the court shall communicate, or have com-
municated, to the defendant the essential facts in the report of the
presentence investigation (from which communication the sources of
confidential information may be excluded) and shall afford the defendant
an opportunity to comment thereon. Any material disclosed to the
defendant or his counsel shall also be disclosed to the attorney for the
government.
The Committee's Note points out that in England and California
the defendant receives a copy of the report in every case; in Alabama
he has a right to inspect the report; in Ohio and Virginia the proba-
tion officer reports in open court and may be examined by the de-
fendant on his report; and in Minnesota a presentence report is open
for inspection by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant's
attorney.74 "Practice in the federal courts is mixed, with a sub-
stantial minority of judges permitting disclosure while most deny
it.,,15
A few conclusions can be ventured by the writer with respect
to the proposals of the Advisory Committee. In the first place, it is
highly desirable to allow a defendant to have the opportunity to
inspect his own pretrial statements and confessions to the police, in
whatever form they may have been made. There is very little
opportunity for tampering with witnesses to keep out such evidence,
and therefore at least one of the traditional objections to liberalized
7 See S. 2008, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), introduced by Sen. Ervin (N.C.) and
others.
"The Advisory Committee's Note to this proposed amendment contains relevant
citations.7 5 Ibid.
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discovery misses its mark in this situation. While a defendant may
perjure himself concerning the circumstances under which a pretrial
statement was given in order to dispute its voluntariness and its
admissibility, he is probably almost equally prone to do this whether
or not he knows beforehand the specific contents of the pretrial
statement. In some instances, knowledge that the accused has made
an incriminating pretrial statement will lead his counsel to tender
a plea of guilty, although it must be conceded that frequently a
prosecutor, to induce a guilty plea, will be quite willing to apprise
a defense counsel before trial of the existence and even the details
of a pretrial statement if it is really incriminating. From the stand-
point of a counsel appointed to represent an indigent and often
illiterate defendant, it is almost impossible in many instances to
provide effective representation without knowledge before trial of
the details of statements made by the defendant to police officers
after he was first taken into custody-statements which sometimes
will point the way to some type of defense or mitigation, such as
insanity, self-defense, drunkenness negating specific intent, or "heat
of passion." Any harm which might derive from allowing discovery
of pretrial statements seems infinitesimal in comparison with the
good to be achieved therefrom in preventing an unjust conviction.
The same reasoning would apply with respect to the testimony
given by the defendant before the grand jury. There he is at a
considerable disadvantage, without the aid of counsel, subject to
skillful interrogation, and chargeable with perjury for any false
testimony. In fairness, the defendant's counsel should be furnished
the opportunity before trial to know what his client told the grand
jury.
If the Government has chosen to proceed against two persons
under the same indictment and to bring them to trial together as
codefendants, then it would seem that neither should be considered
a "prospective Government witness" as to the other, and their
pretrial statements should not be given the immunity from pretrial
discovery which is provided under the Jencks Act.76 Certainly the
pretrial statements of a person whose connection with the alleged
offense is so intimate that he has been named a codefendant would
seem to be quite material to the preparation of a defense, and a
" 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
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request therefor would appear eminently reasonable. Under the
March, 1964, proposals, the provision for in camera inspection of
such statements by the court pursuant to rule 14 in ruling on motions
for severance might tend to discourage a court's granting outright
discovery of these statements under rule 16. It would seem more
appropriate simply to authorize the discovery and inspection of a
codefendant's pretrial statements, including his grand jury testimony,
and then, to allow a defendant to make his motion for severance
on the basis of the contents of the pretrial statement. Of course,
in this situation, just as in connection with discovery of a defendant's
own pretrial statements, the opportunity for tampering with the
evidence which the defendant has discovered is rather limited.
The results of scientific tests-fingerprint and handwriting com-
parisons, ballistics tests, blood analyses, and the like-may loom so
large in determining guilt or innocence that a defendant might
cheerfully trade a competent lawyer for a helpful expert. However,
an indigent defendant-or even a moderately well-heeled one-often
cannot afford to pay for the services of a needed expert. Indeed, the
failure tQ make available to the defense counsel necessary ancillary
investigative facilities, including qualified experts to make scientific
tests, is one of the gaps in many assigned counsel or defender systems
for providing representation for the indigent defendant in criminal
cases. A broad right of discovery with respect to the results of
scientific tests performed by or for Government investigators would
help mitigate the effects of this failure. Here again the opportunity
for an accused to suppress or tamper with the evidence against him
is inherently very limited by reason of the character of the evidence
involved, and the pretrial accessibility to the defendant of informa-
tion about the results of scientific tests does not tilt the scales of
justice unduly in his favor. In some instances, as with fingerprint
comparisons, an independent expert might find it impossible to
reach any meaningful conclusion without access to the extensive
records in the hands of the Government. Thus, every argument
seems to favor the broad discovery of scientific test results proposed
by the Advisory Committee.
Under the wording of both the December, 1962, and the March,
1964, proposals for revision of rule 16, it would seem unclear
whether the previous conviction records of prospective witnesses,
either Government or defense witnesses, would be documents subject
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to discovery and inspection. Certainly the documents containing
those records are "within the possession, custody or control of the
government,"-namely, the Federal Bureau of Investigation-and
they are not "statements" subject to the Jencks Act in the case of
Government witnesses. Previous convictions are a recognized method
of impeaching witnesses,77 and thus information with respect thereto
would seem "material to the preparation" of the defense. In
light of the ease with which the FBI provides such records at the
request of federal or state authorities, a request for them would
seem quite "reasonable" within the meaning of rule 16 in its present
form or as it would be revised by the Advisory Committee. While it
may be doubtful that the Advisory Committee really intended to
make the arrest and conviction records of prospective witnesses sub-
ject to discovery under rule 16, it would not be amiss clearly
to authorize some right of discovery of prior convictions, at least
with respect to prospective Government witnesses.78
In this connection it should be reemphasized that cross-examina-
tion of a witness is permitted with respect to some of his previous
convictions.7 9 If a defense witness falsely denies the existence of a
criminal record, the prosecutor will usually be able to question him
in detail on the basis of the arrest and conviction record furnished
by the FBI; and if the witness continues to deny the prior convic-
tions, a prosecution for perjury might later be undertaken, if the
falsity is deemed sufficiently material to justify such action. But what
if a Government witness falsely denies the existence of a criminal
record? A conscientious prosecutor who is aware from records in his
possession that the witness is testifying falsely would seem to be under
an obligation, as an officer of the court, to bring the deception to the
attention of the trial judge and of the defense counsel, but, of course,
one can only conjecture whether this obligation would be fulfilled.
Furthermore, the prosecutor may not have the witness' conviction
record at hand; and in this event, the false testimony will go un-
detected. In light of the defense counsel's right to cross-examine
Government witnesses about previous convictions, why should the
defense be precluded from obtaining such information until the
713 WIGMORE § 980.
Is There is probably not too much occasion for concern in behalf of a defendant
or defense counsel whose own witnesses misinform him before trial about their
criminal records.
70 3 WIGMORE § 980.
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time of trial-and then subject to the witness' truthfulness upon
cross-examination? The primary effect produced by the present
system is that some Government witnesses will successfully conceal
a past criminal record, either because the prosecution fails to
recognize the falsification or fails in its duty to inform the court
of the deceit practiced by the witness.
What undue advantage would pretrial discovery of a witness'
criminal record provide to the defense? How would it tend to
induce perjury or the suppression of evidence-or any of the other
evils which it is sometimes claimed follow in the wake of discovery?
Accordingly, unless in some way it can be assured that any false
replies to cross-examination at the trial concerning prior convictions
will be readily detected and brought at the time to the attention
of the court and of defense counsel, pretrial discovery concerning the
conviction record of Government witnesses should be authorized.
In the alternative a procedure similar to that of the Jencks Act might
be devised under which after a Government witness testified on
direct examination, a defense counsel could obtain information as
to any prior convictions which would be a proper subject of cross-
examination for impeachment purposes. Of course, there would
probably be no occasion in most instances to grant discovery con-
cerning arrests or indictments, which generally are held inadmissible
for impeachment purposes, 0 or with respect to convictions which,
under the applicable rules of evidence, could not be used for im-
peachment.
Some misgivings have already been expressed in this article
with respect to the effort to provide a bilateral expansion of dis-
covery by giving the Government either a conditional or an absolute
right to copy and inspect documents which the defendant intends
to produce at the trial. Similar questions can be raised about 1he
constitutionality or desirability of the notice of alibi which would
have "been required under the December, 1962, proposal by the
Advisory Committee. On the other hand, the notice of intent to
rely upon insanity does not seem objectionable and at the very
least is preferable to the notice of alibi. The diminution of the
opportunity for the Government to utilize rule 17 (b), dealing with
the issuance of subpoenas at the request of an indigent defendant, as
O Id. § 980a.
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a means for discovery against a defendant helps remove a source of
economic discrimination present in the current federal rules.
With respect to discovery concerning the contents of the report
of presentence investigation, the March, 1964, proposal by the Ad-
visory Committee goes further than that of December, 1962; and
either proposal represents an improvement of the present wording,
which apparently leaves the matter of discovery in the discretion
of the sentencing judge. Under these proposals, specific provision
is made for excluding from the scope of discovery "the sources of
confidential information"; therefore, a judge can use his discretion
to avoid any disclosures which might threaten future accessibility
of information to the Government. Yet, at the same time, the
defendant is provided with an opportunity to correct erroneous
derogatory information which might lead to an unduly severe
sentence.
Suggestions will undoubtedly now be heard that the Advisory
Committee should have gone further in providing absolute and
unconditional rights of discovery in behalf of defendants, that the
Jencks Act should have been overhauled or repealed entirely, and
that 18 U.S.C. § 3482 should have been broadened to require that
a defendant be furnished with a list of prospective Government wit-
nesses not only in capital cases but also in all cases, or at least in all
felony cases. In connection with the failure to suggest more sweep-
ing changes, it should be noted that, as will be discussed next, the
courts have been developing a new safeguard for defendants through
requirements that the prosecution act to protect a defendant from
the unjust consequences of the circumstance that only limited in-
formation is available to him.
IV
NEw RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PROSECUTOR
In many fields acceptance is being gained for the view that the
Government should not take advantage of a citizen's ignorance of
material facts in its dealings with him. For example, the Court of
Claims has recently recognized a duty on the part of federal officials
to disclose to contractors information in their possession which
would not be available to a contractor but might increase materially
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his bid on a proposed contract.8 ' At least one governmental agency,
the Urban Renewal Administration, now takes the position that in
negotiating for the purchase of property from a private landowner,
no offer should be made to him below the figure of the lowest
appraisal in the Government's hand. 2 In short, this agency does
not wish to profit by the landowner's ignorance of the true value
of his own property.
Similarly, it has been recognized for many years that the Govern-
ment, through its agent, the prosecutor, owes some responsibility to
the citizen who faces it as a defendant in the criminal courts. The
Supreme Court explained many years ago in Berger v. United
States83 that a prosecutor
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.
In military justice the prosecutor was at one time subject to a
theoretical responsibility to a defendant which would be almost
impossible to perform; as "judge advocate" of a court-martial, he
was supposed not only to prosecute but also to perform judicial
responsibilities and at the same time to assure that the interests of
the accused were protected.8 4 This somewhat unrealistic combina-
8x See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963),
where, in holding that the Government had failed in its obligation to make proper
disclosure to the contractor, the court commented: "In this situation the Government,
possessing vital information which it was aware the bidders needed but would not have,
could not properly let them flounder on their own. Although it is not a fiduciary
toward its contractors, the Government-where the balance of knowledge is so clearly
on its side-can no more betray a contractor into a ruinous course of action by silence
than by the written or spoken word."
12 1 HHFA URBAN RENEWAL MANUAL 1342 (1962).
83295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). This case was relied on by the majority In Griffin v.
United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950), where the court ruled that the
prosecutor should have revealed to the defense, in a first degree murder trial in which
there was a claim of self-defense, that a morgue attendant had found an open knife
in the victim's pocket. According to the court, "the case emphasizes the necessity of
disclosure by the prosecution of evidence that may reasonably be considered admissible
and useful to the defense. When there is substantial room for doubt, the prosecution
is not to decide for the court what is admissible or for the defense what is useful."
Ibid.
84 WINTHROP, MxLrrARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 193 (2d ed. 1920 reprint) points out
that in addition to his duties as prosecutor, the judge advocate has a duty as a min-
ister of justice. Accordingly, Colonel Winthrop apparently considered that he should
introduce all the witnesses present at the commission of the act charged or cognizant of
the same, instead of selecting only those witnesses whose testimony would tend to
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tion of functions still persists in the summary court-martial, where
a single officer serves as prosecutor, defense counsel, judge, and
jury.8 5
In Mooney v. Holohan8 the Supreme Court established that a
criminal conviction violated due process under the fourteenth
amendment if it was procured by state prosecuting authorities
through the use of perjured testimony known by them to be perjured
and knowingly used by them in order to obtain the conviction. The
scope of this concept was somewhat broadened in Alcorta v. Texas,87
where a defendant was appealing from a conviction for the murder
of his wife, for which he had been sentenced to death. At his trial
he testified that he had slain his wife in "sudden passion" after
seeing her kissing a man named Castilleja late at night in a parked
car; this evidence, if believed, would have reduced the crime to a
lower degree of homicide. However, Castilleja, the only eyewitness
to the killing, testified for the state, in response to questions from
the prosecutor, that he had simply driven the deceased home from
work a few times and had had nothing more than a casual friendship
with her. Subsequent to Alcorta's conviction, Castilleja admitted
that he had had sexual intercourse with Alcorta's wife on several
occasions shortly before her death, that he had informed the prose-
cutor of this before trial, and that he had been told not to volunteer
convict. Ibid. Moreover, the judge advocate was bound to furnish to the court-martial
his opinion on any question of law, practice, or procedure arising in the course of the
trial. Id. at 194. After pointing out that article of war 90 required that after the
prisoner had made his plea, the judge advocate should "so far consider himself counsel
for the prisoner as to object to any leading question to any of the witnesses, and to
any question to the prisoner the answer to which might tend to incriminate himself,"
Winthrop discusses the duty of the judge advocate as counsel or adviser of the
accused. Id. at 196-99. These duties were especially broad in scope where the
accused was ignorant and without capable counsel. Id. at 198-99.
"g UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, arts. 16, 20, 70A Stat. 42, 43 (1956), 10
U.S.C. §§ 816, 820 (1958).
294 U.S. 103 (1935). See also Pyle v. Kansas, 817 U.S. 218 (1942).
3, 855 U.S. 28 (1957). For another Texas capital case where the conviction was
set aside, see Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
There the district attorney had failed to disclose to defendants' counsel the fact, known
to him, that a psychiatrist and psychologist engaged by the state had given an opinion
that the two defendants were "legally incompetent." Even though the undisclosed
evidence was only opinion, the fact that such an opinion had been formed by such an
obviously objective witness as one engaged by the prosecution to make the mental
examination would have been helpful to the defendants and should have been revealed.
The majority of the court of appeals relied heavily on United States v. Dye, 221 F.2d
763 (3d Cir. 1955), where a conviction of murder was reversed because the prosecutor
failed to reveal to the defense that a police officer had reported that the accused had
been under the influence of alcohol. The prosecution had called another police officer
who had testified that the accused was sober and did not appear to have been drunk.
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any information about the intercourse but to answer truthfully if
specifically asked about it. The prosecutor subsequently conceded
that these statements by Castilleja were true, that he had not told the
defendant about Castilleja's intercourse with Alcorta's wife, and,
that instead of including this information in a written statement
taken from Castilleja prior to trial, he had noted it in a separate
record. The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion reversed the
conviction on the ground that the defendant had been denied due
process.
In Napue v. Illinois8S the defendant had been convicted of
murder after a trial in which the principal state witness, then serving
a 199 year sentence for the same murder, testified in response to a
question by the assistant state's attorney that he had received no
promise of special consideration in return for his testimony. The
assistant state's attorney had in fact made such a promise, but he did
nothing to correct the false testimony. This failure of the prosecu-
tor, according to the Supreme Court, deprived the defendant of due
process in violation of the fourteenth amendment. In the Court's
eyes, it made no difference that the false testimony pertained only to
credibility or that the witness had testified that some lawyer from
the office of the public defender had said he was going to try to do
something to get the witness' sentence reduced. The conviction
must fall, declared a unanimous Court, "when the State, although
not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it
appears."89
A year ago, in Brady v. Maryland,90 the Supreme Court went
much further than in previous cases. There Brady and a companion,
Boblit, after separate trials, were convicted of murder in the first
degree and sentenced to death. At his trial, Brady had taken the
stand and had admitted his participation in the crime, but he had
claimed that Boblit had done the actual killing. Apparently, on this
basis, Brady's counsel, while conceding in the summation to the
jury that Brady was guilty of murder in the first degree, had asked
that the jury return a verdict "without capital punishment." Prior
to the trial, petitioner's counsel had requested that the prosecution
88 360 U.S. 264 (1959). In People v. Savvides, I N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956), it was held reversible error for the prosecution to fail to reveal
that a prosecution witness had lied when he testified that he had not been assured
leniency in return for testifying.
89 360 U.S. at 269.
9 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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let him examine Boblit's extrajudicial statements. Several of these
had been shown to him; but one dated July 9, 1958, in which
Boblit had admitted the actual homicide, was withheld and did not
come to the attention of Brady's counsel until after his client had
been tried, convicted, and sentenced and after his conviction had
been affirmed. Subsequently, Brady moved in the trial court for a
new trial based on the newly discovered evidence. The petition for
post-conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court, but the Mary-
land Court of Appeals held that the suppression of the evidence by
the prosecution denied petitioner due process of law and remanded
the case for retrial on the question of punishment, not the question of
guilt. The Supreme Court affirmed this action, agreeing with the
Court of Appeals that "suppression of this confession was a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 91
On its facts the Brady case would not seem particularly sig-
nificant, since delivery of some of Boblit's pretrial statements with-
out any mention of the really significant confession could be con-
strued as a sort of misrepresentation by the prosecution. However,
after reiterating that it is a violation of due process "when the State,
although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected
when it appears," 92 the Court added:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. . . . A prosecution
that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made avail-
able, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a
trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in
the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with
standards of justice, even though, as in the present case, his action is not
"the result of guile," to use the words of the Court of Appeals.93
Since the Supreme Court in the Brady case was concerned with
the withholding of evidence which had been demanded or requested
by the accused, the diligent defense counsel may wish to demand
before trial an opportunity to see every part of the prosecutor's file,
Refusal by the prosecution to grant this request may be followed up
after the trial, as in Brady, by a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence or a petition for post-conviction relief
0 1 1d. at 86.
02 Id. at 87, quoting from Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
03 Id. at 87-88.
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under the applicable post-conviction procedure act. For purposes
of such a petition, the defendant or his counsel will probably make
allegations in very broad terms as to withholding evidence and
then seek discovery of the documents which were not exhibited to
the defense despite its prior broad request for evidence.
The prosecutor, either in a state or federal court, who is con-
fronted with a sweeping demand from the defense for an opportunity
to examine his file will face a considerable compulsion to grant
such a demand. Otherwise, any conviction he obtains may be sub-
ject to constitutional attack on due process grounds; and to such an
attack, the limitations on criminal discovery contained in the
applicable rules of criminal procedure will have only slight rele-
vance.
Can a new constitutional assault on the Jencks Act be launched
from the vantage point of Brady? Probably not in the usual situa-
tion, since under that act the defense counsel does receive access to
the pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses after their direct
testimony and at a time when the pretrial statements can be effective-
ly used for impeachment purposes. If, however, the pretrial state-
ment of a Government witness contained information potentially of
great assistance to the defense but of limited utility because of the
time in the trial at which it was furnished to the defense counsel, an
argument could be made that irrespective of the Jencks Act, the
defendant had been deprived of due process by the withholding
of evidence "which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him
or reduce the penalty." Similarly, if, after the defense requested
certain statements, the prosecutor withheld those statements on
the ground that they had been made by a "prospective Government
witness" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (a), if this wit-
ness was not called and the statements were not furnished to the
defense when the Government rested its case, and if these state-
ments contained "leads" to evidence which would have materially
benefited the defense, any conviction would seem subject to question
on due process grounds.
In Brady, Napue, and A icorta, the prosecutor had participated in
withholding or suppressing evidence favorable to the defendant.
What if, however, the prosecutor is unaware of the evidence favor-
able to the defendant because that evidence has also been withheld
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from him by the investigators?94 In other words, should the prin-
ciple of Brady be affected by the identity of the governmental agent
who "helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant"?
The actions of investigators in obtaining coerced confessions have
led to reversal on due process grounds of the convictions resulting
from those confessions.9 5 Would and should their actions in with-
holding evidence lead to any different outcome?
V
CONCLUSION
A trend towards an expanded right of discovery for defendants
in criminal cases is underway in state and federal courts. The
availability of this right, together with the constitutional require-
ment that every accused be provided with legally trained counsel
to represent him, will reduce some of the disadvantages suffered by
an indigent defendant in the administration of criminal justice. In
many situations, the broadening of the defendant's opportunity to
obtain discovery should not impose an undue burden on the prosecu-
tion; but, for the problems which will be created, a sweeping re-
ciprocal expansion of the prosecution's right to discovery does not
seem the best solution.
The prosecution is also being placed under ever increasing
responsibilities to assure on its own initiative that the defendant is
furnished with information from its files which might tend to prove
his innocence. The existence of these responsibilities may render
academic some of the discussion which has taken place concerning
the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure and may remedy inadequacies in a defendant's opportunity
for discovery, but it may also lead to lengthy post-conviction attacks
predicated upon the contention that the prosecution has failed in its
duty to provide information requested by the defense. These attacks
may, in turn, produce a resigned willingness on the part of both
state and federal prosecutors to follow the same broad discovery
practice now employed in American courts-martial and English
criminal courts.
0 The California Supreme Court indicated in In re Imbler, 387 P.2d 6, 35 Cal. Rptr.
293 (1963), that perjury by anyone connected with the prosecution or the failure to
reveal knowledge of perjury of prosecution witnesses will justify reversal on due
process grounds even if the prosecutor himself is unaware of the perjury.
0 See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954).
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